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Santrauka
Vertybiø kaitos problema nëra pakankamai iðtirta, ypaè Baltijos ðalyse ir apskritai pokomunistinëse
ðalyse. Ði problema tampa dar aktualesnë eurointegraciniø procesø bei jø átakos visuomenës
vertybinëms orientacijoms kontekste. Todël ðio straipsnio tikslas – iðanalizuoti vertybines orientacijas
bei jø kaità trijose Baltijos ðalyse (Lietuvoje, Latvijoje, Estijoje) ávertinant tai nulëmusius politinius,
ekonominius, socialinius, kultûrinius aspektus.
Tiriant vertybiø kaità remtasi Schwartzo ir Bilsky (1987, 1990) metodologija, Ingleharto  (1990,
1995, 1997, 2000), De Graaf ir Evans (1996) teorinëmis nuostatomis. Empirinë tyrimo dalis
analizuoja apklausos “Baltic Barometer – 2001” duomenis. Ði apklausa – tarptautinio projekto
“Demokratizacija ir socialinë kaita Baltijos ðaliø regione”, koordinuojamo Södertörns universiteto
Ðvedijoje, dalis.
Tyrimo rezultatai atskleidë, kad pagrindinës kultûrinës normos ir vertybinës orientacijos per
pastaruosius deðimtá metø kito neþymiai. Kultûrinis kaitos procesas yra ilgas ir ypaè sunkus vyresnës
kartos þmonëms, kuriø vertybinë sistema formavosi esant kitai socialinei-ekonominei aplinkai. Todël
kultûriniai pokyèiai atsilieka nuo ekonominiø bei politiniø ir vyksta keièiantis kartoms. Kuo didesni
ilgalaikiai ekonominiai pokyèiai ðalyje, tuo labiau skiriasi vertybinës kartø orientacijos.
Vertybiø transformacija, vykstanti europinës integracijos kontekste, neiðvengiamai siejasi su
individualizmo/kolektyvizmo bei modernizmo/tradiciðkumo santykio kaita. Ekonominë bei
technologinë paþanga, nepaisydama tautiniø ribø, skatina visapusiðkà integraciná procesà, todël
iðkyla tautinës ir globalinës kultûros santykio problema, kuri siejasi su tradiciðkumo ir modernizmo
samplaika ðiuolaikinëje kultûroje. Tyrimas atskleidë, kad  amþius yra labai svarbus kintamasis
vertybiø kaitos analizëje.
Lietuvoje, Latvijoje ir Estijoje galima stebëti ðias vertybiø kaitos tendencijas: vertybiniø orientacijø
skirtumai tiesiogiai priklauso nuo respondentø amþiaus ir laikotarpio, kurio metu formavosi vertybinës
nuostatos. Vyresnioji karta labiau vertina tradicines vertybes, o jaunimas imlus naujovëms ir greièiau
perima, internalizuoja naujas vertybes. Jaunimo paþiûros þymiai liberalesnës. Sovietinis laikotarpis
paliko þenklø pëdsakà tuo laikotarpiu brendusiø þmoniø sàmonëje. Tolerancijos socialinëms
maþumoms stoka – uþdaros visuomenës palikimas. Europinë integracija ir demokratizacija keièia
vertybines nuostatas. Jaunimas labiau pasitiki naujomis demokratinëmis institucijomis, yra
liberalesniø paþiûrø, pasiþymi didesne tolerancija socialiniø maþumø atþvilgiu.
Introduction
A new worldview is gradually replacing the
one that has dominated in the totalitarian So-
viet regime over 50 years. The three Baltic
States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – have
been undergoing tremendous transformations
in the sphere of politics, economy and culture.
The consequences of this transformation are
still taking shape, and elements of the older
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culture are still widespread, but the major fea-
tures of the new pattern can be discerned.
   Currently, under the process of
democratisation, a re-orientation process is
going on in all groups of society. In this pro-
cess not only younger but also middle-aged and
old people become adherent to new “modern”
and “post-modern” values strongly supported
by powerful socialisation agents like media,
advertisements, life-style and consumption
models streaming from the West. As a result,
the system of values has been undergoing tre-
mendous changes.
In the process of European integration and
seeking for the membership inside the Euro-
pean Union, the problem of value change re-
mains very significant if we are to understand
processes of change not only in the economy,
politics, and society in general, but in the minds,
outlooks and social behaviour of the people as
well.
The purpose of this paper is to identify simi-
larities and differences in attitudes, beliefs and
value priorities between the three Baltic coun-
tries – Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and to sug-
gest historical, economic, social, cultural, etc.,
aspects of these countries that may account for
the differences.
   When analysing the changes occurring in
the system of values and speaking about its fur-
ther developments it is very important to
analyse cross-generational differences. We may
hypothetically suppose that young people have
quite different perception of democracy com-
pared to those who grew up and formed their
system of values under the Soviet system, or
the strata of elderly people who were raised in
the surrounding of the first independent Re-
public. Post-Soviet youth as a social group and
their beliefs, attitudes, system of values have
not been sufficiently researched. The image of
the new generation, post-Soviet youth, is un-
der the continuous process of development. As
the previous research in the field indicates,
(Liubinienë 1998) the strata of old “pre-So-
viet” intelligentsia was very important in
organising the “silent” resistance against the
Soviet rule and keeping the customs, traditions
alive. It was the key aspect of socialization, at
least in Lithuania, leading finally to the awak-
ening of the nation and “singing revolution”. It
was due to them that “cultural reproduction”
persisted through several generations. The key
aspect of cultural reproduction, as pointed out
by Schöpflin (2000; 15), is that it establishes
the means by which communities seek to keep
themselves in being. Ethnicity, according to
Bourdieu (1993), is about cultural reproduc-
tion.
Another, no less important factor to be
analysed is the effect of the totalitarian period,
which has left a deep imprint in the minds, at-
titudes and beliefs of people. The previous
analysis of attitudes, beliefs and values in the
three Baltic countries (Liubinienë 2002) has
revealed that the similarity of attitudes in all
the three countries may be accounted by the
shared political past. All the three countries
have experienced the Soviet political rule and
Soviet economic development. Thus, they are
similar as ex-socialist countries.
Population and the sample
The survey “Baltic Barometer – 2001” is
the second data release in a series of survey
research conducted at the Södertörns Högskola
by the project “Democracy and Social Transi-
tion in the Baltic Sea Region”. The first survey
was carried out in 1999. In 2001, a survey was
repeated in the Baltic States and Poland with
almost similar question modules. The survey
aimed at providing an overview of the charac-
ters of social transition, values and attitudes of
the respondents in Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania.
The sample was a stratified multi-stage
sample, which is representative to the totality
of the inhabitants of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania at the age 18-75. At the first stage
of sampling, the sampling points with the as-
sistance of computer program following the
proportionality of population and random prin-
ciple were selected. At the second stage of sam-
pling, a random route with starting addresses
was applied. Starting addresses of route method
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were selected from register of inhabitants ap-
plying the principle of random choice.
The population of the place of residence
represented in the sample is as follows:  N =
1.114 in Estonia, 1.110 in Latvia and 1.130 in
Lithuania.
Following the aim to analyse differences in
attitudes, values and beliefs by age, three age
groups have been discerned. The youngest
group has been comprised of the respondents,
aged 18-29. This social group has been raised
and has been forming its identity and the sys-
tem of values under the influence of the new
democratic developments in the three Baltic
countries. In the Lithuanian case this group
makes about 23%, in Latvian – 22%, in Esto-
nian – 24% of the whole sample. The second
group, aged 30-49, represents those people who
were raised and educated under the Soviet sys-
tem, but were young enough to adjust to politi-
cal, economic and social reforms, if they had
been initiative and active enough or willing to
change something in their lives. This group
comprises 38-40% of the whole sample. And,
finally, the third group, aged 50-75, constitutes
36-39% of the sample. It represents the views
of the older generation. The value system of
this group has been formed under the differ-
ent systems and they have found the changes
to be the most difficult.
The data have been analysed using SPSS.
Theoretical background
To analyse the value change in relation to
the processes of democratisation in Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia, cross-generational differ-
ences have been taken into focus. Cultural or
country differences are also very much impor-
tant, and should be taken into account. But,
on the other hand, all the three countries are
similar in sharing the experiences of the Soviet
period and this should also be considered. Cul-
tural distinctions are based on deeply-rooted
values which, in turn, according to Hofstede’s
theory (1980), can be delineated along five fun-
damental dimensions: power distance; individu-
alism versus collectivism; femininity versus
masculinity; uncertainty avoidance; long-term
orientation.
To analyze the effect of age variable for the
value change, some key assumptions of
Inglehart’s theory (1990, 1997b, 2000) have
been used. To analyze the period effect, theo-
retical elaborations of De Graaf and Evans
(1996) have been followed. For country dif-
ferences the theoretical model of Inglehart
(1995, 1997a) has been tested.
Intergenerational change
Inglehart bases the theory of
intergenerational value change on two key hy-
potheses. First, the scarcity hypothesis: “An
individual’s priorities reflect the socio-eco-
nomic environment: one places the greatest
subjective value on those things that are in rela-
tively short supply”. Second, the socialization
hypothesis: “The relationship between socio-
economic environment and value priorities is
not one of immediate adjustment: a substan-
tial time lag is involved because, to a large ex-
tent, one’s basic values reflect the conditions
that prevailed during one’s pre-adult years”
(Inglehart 1990; 68). The combination of these
two basic hypotheses and the assumption of
increasing material prosperity, in Inglehart’s
point of view, are the core of value change. The
thesis refers to both individual (needs and val-
ues) and societal (economic development) fac-
tors. Early socialization, according to Inglehart
(1997; 34), seems to carry greater weight than
later socialization. This, of course, does not
imply that no change occurs during adult years.
Nevertheless, human development seems to be
far more rapid during the pre-adult years than
afterward, this leading to the conclusion that
basic personality change declines sharply after
one reaches adulthood. Fundamental value
change takes place gradually; largely it occurs
as a younger generation replaces an older one
in the adult population of a society.
   Thus, the cohort or generational effect is
associated with the year of birth and concerns
all events that one generation has experienced
and that other generations have not.
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Cultural theory implies that a culture can-
not be changed overnight. Furthermore, when
basic cultural change does occur, it will take
place more rapidly among younger groups,
where it does not need to overcome the resis-
tance of inconsistent early learning, than among
older ones, resulting in intergenerational dif-
ferences. An awareness of the fact that deep-
rooted values are not easily changed is essen-
tial to any realistic and effective program for
social change (Inglehart 1997; 19).
Modern and postmodern values
Modernization theorists from Karl Marx to
Max Weber and Daniel Bell, have argued that
economic development is changing the world
in ways that erode traditional values, bringing
the decline of religion, parochialism and cul-
tural differences. Another major body of lit-
erature presents a seemingly incompatible view.
Huntington (1993, 1996) argues that the world
is divided into eight or nine major civilizations
based on cultural differences that have per-
sisted for centuries – and that the conflicts of
the future will occur along the cultural fault
lines separating these civilizations. Similarly,
Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) argue
that cultural traditions are remarkably endur-
ing and shape the political and economic be-
havior of their societies today. Evidence from
the World Values Survey, Inglehart (2000; 23),
indicates that both claims are true. Economic
development is linked with a syndrome of pre-
dictable changes away from absolute social
norms, toward increasingly rational, tolerant,
trusting and postmodern values. But culture is
path dependent. The fact that a society was
historically Protestant or Orthodox or Islamic
or Confucian gives rise to cultural zones with
distinctive value systems that persist when we
control for the effects of economic develop-
ment. These cultural differences are closely
linked with a number of important social phe-
nomena, from fertility rates to legislation con-
cerning sexual minorities.
Analysing the distinction between materi-
alism and postmaterialism, Inglehart’s theory
predicts that a new worldview reflects a shift
in what people want out of life. It is transform-
ing basic norms governing politics, work, reli-
gion, family and sexual behavior. Thus, the pro-
cess of economic development leads to two
successive trajectories, modernization and
postmodernization. Both of them are strongly
linked with economic development, but
postmodernization represents a later stage of
development that is linked with very different
beliefs from those that characterize modern-
ization. These belief systems are not mere con-
sequences of economic or social changes, but
shape socioeconomic conditions and are shaped
by them, in reciprocal fashion (Inglehart 1997;
8). Postmodernism is the rise of new values and
lifestyles, with greater tolerance for ethnic,
cultural, and sexual diversity and individual
choice concerning the kind of life one wants to
lead (Inglehart1997:23). The best documented
example of the rise of new values is the
intergenerational shift from materialist to
postmaterialist value priorities that seems to
be taking place throughout advanced industrial
society; but the rise of new values and lifestyles
is taking place across many other aspects of
life, from sexual orientation to religion
(Inglehart, 1997:25).
In postmodern society the emphasis on eco-
nomic achievement as the top priority is giving
way to an increasing emphasis on the quality
of life. Individual choice of lifestyles and indi-
vidual self-expression is coming into focus.
Thus, the shift from materialist values, empha-
sizing economic and physical security, is oc-
curring towards postmaterialist values, empha-
sizing individual self-expression and quality of
life.
Period affect
The other group of scientists (De Graaf;
Evans 1996) has tried to prove that value
change appears to be related to non-economic
factors, such as education and severity of war-
time experience. Thus, they have placed em-
phasis on the period effect, which concerns
those events that effect all generations equally
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and at the same point in time. De Graaf and
Evans (1996) point out that only generation
and period effects can account for the relation-
ship between the year of birth and
postmaterialism.
The indicators of postmaterial values can
also be thought of as measuring a dimension of
liberal values relating to commitment to demo-
cratic norms involving freedom of speech, tol-
erance, and concern with ideas and individual
fights (Duch; Taylor 1993). Liberal values are
associated with the level of education. This
might lead to the supposition the more edu-
cated the respondents, the more liberal their
attitudes and beliefs should be. Furthermore,
the liberal values are likely to be transmitted
from parents to children.
The West has had a very different experi-
ence from Central and Eastern Europe. In
Central and Eastern Europe the meanings at-
tached to life experiences are different and
sometimes difficult to understand for Western-
ers. What they hear and see is translated into
their own thought styles and own experiences.
Schöpflin (2000:31) points out, that Western
thought and speech styles are described by
Westerners as pragmatic, professional, future-
orientated and not structured by explicit value
judgments, as “rational”. Post-communists, on
the other hand, are seen as relying heavily on
history, on pathos, on a sense of resentment
and injustice. This is the outcome of specific
historical, cultural and sociological circum-
stances that have given rise to these responses.
The Central and East Europeans respond in
this way because for them fear for the cultural
reproduction and survival of their communi-
ties is a real and authentic experience (Schöpflin
2000; 32). Westerners did not have to experi-
ence this reality.
A very important factor to discuss is the
culture shock that most of the people have ex-
perienced after the fall of the Soviet – totali-
tarian regime. Democratisation has brought not
only political and economic reforms. It has
opened the borders for the numerous cultural
influences, bringing many new problems into
focus. Paradoxically enough, many people liv-
ing in the same country have experienced noth-
ing more but the culture shock as the result of
global influences. Many people have felt lost
and isolated, unsure of how to act and some-
times frightened – a consequence of being out-
side the symbolic web of the previous Soviet
culture that had joined individuals in social life.
   Psychologically, according to Marx (2000;
7), we have to deal with three levels of culture
shock. The culture shock triangle is composed
of emotions, thinking and acquiring new social
skills and identity. Many reasons, such as Eu-
ropean integration, the process of globalisation,
increasing mobility bring intercultural learning
into focus. The culture shock triangle (Marx
2000; 7) provides concrete steps in dealing with
culture shock, from balancing one’s emotions
to developing effective social behaviour.
Country effect
Attitudes, orientations, emotions and ex-
pressions differ strongly among people from
one nation to the other. These differences are
fundamentally cultural.
Historically, the Roman Catholic Church
was the prototype of a hierarchical, centrally
controlled institution; Protestant churches were
relatively decentralized and more open to lo-
cal control. The impact of living in a society
that was historically shaped by once powerful
Catholic or Protestant institutions persists to-
day, shaping everyone – Protestant, Catholic
or other – who is socialized into a given nation’s
culture.
But religion, argues Inglehart (2000; 32), is
not the only factor shaping cultural zones. A
society’s culture reflects its entire historical
heritage. One of the most important historical
events of the 20th century was the rise and fall
of the communist empire that once ruled a third
of the world’s population. Communism has left
a clear imprint on the value systems of those
who lived under it. Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania, historically being part of the Prot-
estant or Roman Catholic Church in Europe,
fall within a communist influenced zone.
Societies with a common cultural heritage
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generally do fall into common clusters. But
their positions also reflect their level of eco-
nomic development, their occupational struc-
ture, their religion, the experience of commu-
nist rule, their colonial heritage and other ma-
jor historical influences (Inglehart 2000; 35).
Analysis and discussion
The values have been analysed following the
methodology of Schwartz and Bilsky (1987,
1990, 1992) who have developed the theory of
universal values and have empirically tested it
in 40 countries. The aim was to test whether
the given values support individualism or col-
lectivity. Thus, a high score prescribed to wealth
would be in favour of power; self-fulfilment and
being influential would support achievement;
varied life and social life – stimulation. Power,
achievement and stimulation are the compo-
nents of individualism. Collectivity is repre-
sented by the emphasis added on universalism
(world peace, social justice), conformity
(honouring of parents, self-discipline) and se-
curity (family health). The results are presented
in Table 1.
Regardless of age, family health is consid-
ered to be the most important value in all the
three Baltic countries. Taken together with
world at peace (free of war and conflict) as well
as honouring of parents and elders, it leads the
top of the list.  A high score provided to these
values might indicate that people in the Baltic
States are still in great need of security guar-
antees. Security, taken in a broad sense, ranges
from political through economic to the secu-
rity of the well-developed health care system.
All these issues are very important in the new
developing democracies and thus they are re-
Table 1.
Means of values by age in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia. Results of F test
Country: Lithuania Latvia Estonia
Age:Values: 18-29 30-49 50-75 F 18-29 30-49 50-75 F 18-29 30-49 50-75 F
Family health 9.74 9.84 9.81 24.66 9.69 9.71 9.75 18.83 9.44 9.66 9.67 21.11
World peace 9.4 9.62 9.57 22.06 9.31 9.62 9.68 47.38*** 9.03 9.22 9.38 34.75*
Honoring of parent 9.39 9.47 9.59 21.3 9.02 9.33 9.45 49.63*** 9.1 9.22 9.56 28.94*
Social justice 9.13 9.18 8.91 36.36* 8.71 8.88 9.02 56.17*** 8.49 8.72 9.03 29.57*
Social life (friends) 9.05 8.83 8.18 61.4*** 8.94 8.4 7.99 64.85*** 8.89 8.68 8.3 35.7*
Wealth (money) 8.88 8.78 8.43 34.67** 7.61 7.24 6.43 85.74*** 7.41 7.37 7.18 34.05*
Self-fulfilment 8.7 8.48 6.53 147.9*** 8.66 8.2 6.91 113.8*** 8.84 8.49 8.02 34.65*
Self-discipline 8.63 8.89 8.39 36.72* 7.74 7.79 8.09 43.99** 7.57 7.84 8.22 41.21**
A varied life 8.53 8.02 6.98 86.87*** 8.07 7.27 6.09 132.2*** 8.41 7.92 7.25 83.11***
Being influential 7.12 6.72 5.92 59.2*** 6.83 5.82 5.2 110.8*** 6.41 5.66 5.83 32.9*
N 268 430 438 241 436 424 268 439 407
p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
flected in the attitudes towards values. There
is no significantly important difference in the
evaluation of these values in Lithuania, whereas
in Estonia and particularly in Latvia the older
generation tends to put even a greater empha-
sis on the importance of world at peace and
honouring of parents. Social justice is the fourth
highly ranked value in support of collectivity.
The older respondents in Estonia and Latvia
are much more likely to put value on social jus-
tice than the younger respondents, whereas in
Lithuania the process is quite the opposite. The
young are more likely than the old to be con-
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cerned about social justice. The same tendency
could be observed analysing the value of self-
discipline. Does it mean that the young gen-
eration in Lithuania is more conformist and
more likely to support collective type of values
in comparison to the young of Latvia and Es-
tonia? The answer might be positive because
of specific cultural differences between the
countries.
Values in favour of individualism are likely
to be rated lower in all the three countries (with
the exception of self-discipline, which is scored
the lowest from all collectivity values). But in
this part, the age effect could be analysed, as
the difference in evaluation due to age is sig-
nificantly important in all the three countries.
The young, regardless of the country, put
greater value to wealth (money), which is sup-
posed to mean power, social life (friends), var-
ied life, self-fulfilment and being influential.
The emphasis put on power, achievement
and stimulating life brings the young genera-
tion of the Baltic States closer to their coun-
terparts in many western democracies. This
might indicate that the value system of the
young could be changing much more rapidly,
compared to the value system of the old. Age
in this case could be regarded as the indicator
of change.
Similar tendencies could be observed while
analysing the evaluation of another set of vari-
ables, which provides the answer to the ques-
tion “what makes a good citizen?” Respondents
had to answer how important for a good citi-
zen was to consider the phenomena listed in
Table 2.
Table 2.
Means of evaluation by age of “a good citizen” in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia. Results of F test
Country: Lithuania Latvia Estonia
Age:A good citizen is: 18-29 30-49 50-75 F 18-29 30-49 50-75 F 18-29 30-49 50-75 F
To learn the national 9.28 9.27 9.19 14.31 9.12 9.21 9.37 36.42** 9.03 9.0 8.99 19.52
language
To take personal 8.54 8.56 7.82 41.58** 8.69 9.22 8.79 47.42*** 8.99 9.28 9.17 23.64
responsibility
To obey laws and 8.58 8.71 8.99 30.56* 8.78 8.93 9.24 47.42*** 8.81 8.81 9.01 27.99
regulations
To pay taxes 8.33 8.34 8.86 28.33 8.0 8.4 9.18 93.7*** 8.26 8.44 8.86 47.09**
To stay informed about 8.53 8.65 8.39 18.97 8.31 8.56 8.59 20.48 8.2 8.17 8.43 32.4*
what goes on
To treat minorities as 8.33 8.83 8.41 30.89 7.99 8.38 8.6 41.15** 8.11 8.3 8.24 21.89
other inhabitants
To vote in public elections 8.09 8.13 8.42 25.72 7.61 7.87 8.53 66.68*** 7.45 7.31 7.54 24.99
To show solidarity with 7.04 7.39 7.49 27.83 7.47 7.6 8.09 41.47** 7.3 7.31 7.79 38.83**
people
To do military service 6.67 7.62 8.18 66.58*** 6.77 7.55 8.46 87.98*** 7.21 7.97 8.41 67.27***
To influence political 5.95 6.51 6.36 22.5 6.1 6.25 6.48 29.36 5.74 5.99 6.21 32.92*
decisions
To be ready to break a law 6.14 6.68 5.95 35.59* 5.83 5.76 5.11 40.48** 5.49 5.52 4.96 28.18
N 268 430 438 241 436 424 268 439 407
p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
 The most significant age-related differences
are observed in the Latvian sample. It could
be explained both by period and by genera-
tional effect. The young in Latvia are less likely
than the old to emphasize the importance of
learning the national language, taking personal
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Table 3.
Means of justification of the following social phenomena by age in Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia. Results of F test
Country: Lithuania Latvia Estonia
Age:Phenomena: 18-29 30-49 50-75 F 18-29 30-49 50-75 F 18-29 30-49 50-75 F
Euthanasia 6.53 6.8 4.73 89.27*** 5.57 5.42 3.92 43.57*** 6.0 5.78 4.86 54.5***
Divorce 5.78 5.78 4.21 75.68*** 6.04 6.05 5.34 45.81*** 6.7 6.43 5.96 30.59
Abortion 4.81 4.83 2.80 111.8*** 4.82 5.11 4.3 37.97** 5.21 5.66 4.82 25.8
Avoiding fares 3.72 3.27 1.97 80.67*** 5.1 3.94 2.44 161.8*** 4.66 3.73 2.58 101.1***
on public
transport
Homosexuality 3.66 2.38 0.97 152.1*** 3.05 2.18 0.91 127.6*** 4.08 3.03 1.74 103.1***
Prostitution 3.38 3.23 1.44 111.5*** 2.96 3.23 1.54 117.2*** 3.65 3.13 1.77 89.8***
Buying 2.14 1.33 0.83 80.96*** 2.53 1.38 0.69 136.1*** 2.18 1.3 0.83 81.79***
stolen goods
Suicide 1.97 2.04 1.43 38.74** 2.38 2.23 1.76 54.62*** 2.5 2.33 1.66 49.63***
Accepting 1.8 1.63 0.82 81.49*** 1.58 1.1 0.69 62.39*** 1.74 1.33 0.78 69.79***
bribes
Claming social 1.82 1.48 1.2 43.61** 2.89 1.98 1.27 113.7*** 2.56 1.61 1.19 80.51***
benefits
N 268 430 438 241 436 424 268 439 407
p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
responsibility, obeying laws and regulations,
treating minorities as other inhabitants. The
older respondents are much more likely to pay
taxes, to vote in public elections, to show soli-
darity with people who are worse off and to do
military service, compared to the younger re-
spondents. The young in Latvia and Lithuania
are more likely to be ready to break the law
when one’s conscience demands it. In the
Lithuanian sample the significant difference
between the responses of the different age
groups is observed only in several cases. The
young in Lithuania (aged 18-29), contrary to
the other countries, are more apt to take per-
sonal responsibility. Higher score on responsi-
bility taken together with higher ranking of
social justice discussed previously, might lead
to the supposition that some of the discrepan-
cies could be explained taking into account
country differences. But similar to other coun-
tries, the young in Lithuania are less concerned
about doing military service and obeying laws
and regulations. In the Estonian case, the young
are less likely to pay taxes, to show solidarity
with people who are worse off, to do military
service and to influence political decisions. We
do not find any significant age-related differ-
ences in the evaluation of other phenomena.
The analysis of age-related differences
points to the gap between the attitudes of those
over 50, and those under 30 years of age. Here
we could discuss the process of
intergenerational change. The analysis of the
next group of variables (Table 3) could bring
to more empirical evidence.
The most significant age-related differences
could be found when analysing attitudes to-
wards the phenomena listed in Table 3. It could
be explained relying on the fact that the Baltic
States belong to the cluster of post-Soviet coun-
tries. Such social phenomena as “homosexual-
ity” or “prostitution” were denied as not exist-
ing in the Soviet Union. Only with the advance
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of democracy it became possible to discuss
openly the problems related to homosexuality,
prostitution, abortion, euthanasia or suicide.
These were the issues raised by media first of
all. Thus, the opening borders and advance-
ment of democracy has revealed lots of prob-
lems that have never been discussed openly
previously. The discussions exposed a high de-
gree of intolerance towards the phenomena,
which had been ignored for such a long time.
Lack of tolerance is the main characteristic
feature of the old generation. Tolerance of dif-
ference is fostered through understanding of
difference. But it is much more difficult to ad-
just to the new set of values in older age and
we may assume that it is impossible to stay
objective if one has got no wish to accept the
influences of other cultures the way they exist
without passing a personal judgement on it.
   The young could be characterised as more
tolerant in their judgements, as the process of
socialisation and value formation of the young
has already been taking form under develop-
ing democracy. Their attitudes may be still dif-
ferent from the attitudes of western youth, but
they are much more tolerant, compared to their
parents and grandparents.
   On the other hand, the older generation
having expressed their negative attitude to-
wards buying of stolen goods, accepting bribes,
claiming social benefits and avoiding fares on
public transport, reveal that they put greater
emphasis on honesty, fairness and plain deal-
ing. It is a reflection of the system of values,
which supposedly has been formed under the
strong influence of religious mores and other
traditional beliefs. It might seem strange, but
those who are in a real need of social support
(e.g. retired people), reprehend claiming so-
cial benefits or avoiding fares on public trans-
port.
Table 4
Personal trust in social institutions by age in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia. Results of F test
Country:        Lithuania                              Latvia                                  Estonia
Age:Institutions: 18-29 30-49 50-75 F 18-29 30-49 50-75 F 18-29 30-49 50-75 F
Hospitals 6.49 6.23 6.94 48.48*** 7.04 6.39 7.05 62.52*** 6.83 6.3 7.12 54.82***
The churches 6.28 6.81 7.65 63.72*** 7.16 7.22 7.96 49.94*** 6.6 6.49 7.57 60.88***
Private enterprises 6.31 5.67 5.2 34.04* 5.81 4.96 4.68 44.36*** 5.65 5.08 5.02 37.67**
Universities 7.13 7.0 6.98 25.06 7.58 7.29 7.54 31.54* 7.9 7.74 7.98 28.77
Central bank 6.2 5.53 4.91 43.34** 6.47 5.99 5.8 34.19* 6.74 6.4 6.38 16.45
Press (newspapers) 6.9 7.1 7.1 24.12 6.24 6.0 6.18 27.48 5.92 5.84 6.19 24.28
Television, Radio 6.92 7.09 7.17 35.19* 6.5 6.14 6.4 36.37* 6.41 6.15 6.59 27.83
Trade unions 4.72 4.79 4.53 54.39*** 5.07 4.86 4.75 43.27** 5.43 5.14 5.51 31.48*
National military 5.41 5.6 5.62 38.51** 5.34 5.35 6.16 42.84** 6.23 6.45 7.05 35.51*
President 5.25 5.5 5.22 35.09** 6.22 6.53 7.08 63.46*** 6.55 6.53 6.73 36.68*
Government 3.82 3.76 3.62 45.03*** 3.87 4.11 4.09 22.69 4.27 4.25 4.15 26.32
Parliament 3.53 3.2 3.27 49.65*** 3.67 3.7 3.66 41.99** 4.08 4.02 4.07 27.99
Political parties 3.03 2.97 2.7 30.59 3.59 3.23 2.82 42.66** 3.75 3.57 3.36 35.79*
Election administr. 5.53 5.7 5.05 34.41* 5.17 5.59 5.94 35.9* 5.61 5.97 5.87 32.15*
Courts 4.53 4.05 3.6 33.86* 5.62 4.96 4.67 41.54** 5.97 5.65 5.81 19.28
Police 4.34 3.99 4.13 40.57** 5.12 4.85 5.09 35.06* 5.31 5.19 5.47 32.28*
N 268 430 438 241 436 424 268 439 407
p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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Analysis of trust in social institutions has
revealed similar tendencies, as discussed pre-
viously. Some of the social institutions included
in the list symbolize the new democratic devel-
opments (central bank, private enterprises).
Others have undergone many reforms to be-
come democratic  (press, television, universi-
ties, courts). Some have been reestablished
from the past (president, the church), others
have the new content but the old name left (po-
litical parties, trade unions, government).
The older respondents are likely to have
more trust in hospitals, the church, national
military, whereas the young generation has got
bigger trust in new democratic institutions. The
young have got more trust in central bank, pri-
vate enterprises and courts.
There is no difference between the attitudes
of the old and the young concerning the trust
in press (ranked the highest in Lithuania), and
universities (ranked the highest in Estonia and
Latvia). This might lead to the supposition that
education and mass media are considered to
be the most democratic institutions by the re-
spondents of the Baltic States. Television, ra-
dio act as the agents of socialization even in
the old age, the influence of TV is overwhelm-
ing, but still it has not been able to change the
world outlooks of the elderly people (towards
homosexuality) as their attitudes have been
formed in their young days and are not likely
to change so quickly. Education is seen as a
very important factor by all the respondents,
which might indicate that liberal viewpoints
might take over the conservative with time and
due to the intergenerational change.
Conclusions
Political, economic and social developments
in all the three Baltic States are overwhelming
and leading to the establishment of real demo-
cratic states. But the attitudes, beliefs and val-
ues of people who have been living under three
or two different social systems have not
changed significantly over 10 years. Age is a
very important variable for cultural change, i.e.,
change in people’s attitudes, beliefs and value
systems of. The age-based analysis of the atti-
tudes towards many different social develop-
ments in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia has re-
vealed some general tendencies.
1. Significant age-related differences are
evident from the generational perspective.
2. Traditional values are deeply rooted
among elderly people is true.
3. The young are more open to change and
their value system is a representation of more
liberal outlooks.
4. The Soviet period has left a deep im-
print in the attitudes, beliefs and value systems
of the people who were raised under the sys-
tem. This is particularly evident in the lack of
tolerance towards different marginal groups,
and this is the relic of the closed society.
5. The young have got greater trust in new
democratic institutions, compared to the elder.
This feature and inter-generational difference
in attitudes is interpreted as being closely re-
lated to the processes of European integration
and EU accession that is making significant
contribution for diffusion of democratic val-
ues and attitudes in the Baltics.
6. There is little empirical evidence for the
manifestation of postmaterialist values, neither
among the elder nor among the young.
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